The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 2
Number 4 Volume 2, October 1956, Number 4

Article 2

Morality of Right-To-Work Laws: Additional Comments
Bernard H. Fitzpatrick

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

In the July, 1956 issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER several viewpoints
were expressed concerning "Right-to-Work" legislation, some directed
at Mr. Fitzpatrick's earlier article which appeared in April, 1956. The
following reply is Mr. Fitzpatrick's answer to some of the objections
to his position.

Morality of Right-To-Work Laws:
Additional Comments
BERNARD
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T HE "RIGHT

OF ASSOCIATION" is a notion relied upon by all disputants
save Father Cronin. 1 Father Kelley argues that compulsory union
2
membership is a necessary means to achieve the goal of free association.
Professor Morris, Father Falque and Father Keller rightly point out
that this is a contradiction in terms. 3 "Freedom to associate," as Professor Morris says, includes "the freedom not to associate, otherwise
'4
there is merely the compulsion to associate."
But Professor Morris and Fathers Falque and Keller carry their common observation to a conclusion too rigid by presuming that free association is the sole basis of collective action. While a labor union as such
may be a voluntary association, a "bargaining unit" is not. 5 A man is
a member of a "bargaining unit" because the statute says he is or because
he is a craftsman whose rate of pay affects the rates of others in a
local labor market or because he is a worker whose product competes
with the products of others whose homogeneous work is affected by his
rate of pay. A "bargaining unit" is determined by matters extrinsic to
6
any individual worker.
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of the New York Bar.
I Cronin, Right-To-Work Laws, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 186 (July

1956).

2 Kelley, A Moral Study, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 190, 194 (July 1956).

3 Morris, Mr. Fitzpatrick on the Morality of Right-To-Work Laws-Comment, 2
CATHOLIC LAWYER 183 (July 1956); Falque, The True Purpose of Right-To-Work
Laws, 2 id. at 202; KELLER, THE CASE FOR RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 42 (1956).
4 Morris, supra note 3. The voluntary character of the trade union as such is
recognized. Quadragesimo Anno, para. 87, Two BASIC SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 145
(The Catholic University of America Press. 1943).
5 The writer is using the term "bargaining unit" multifariously to include: (a) the
statutory unit determined by the exercise of the legislative function of the N.L.R.B.
[29 U.S.C. §159(b) (1952)]; (b) the "trade-territorial" jurisdiction of the craft
union which was the basis of its standard setting (roughly, the local labor market);
and (c) the "competing industry" jurisdiction of the industrial union.
6 Cf. Quadragesimo Anno, op. cit. supra note 4. at para. 86, p. 143.
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Perhaps the closest analogue to aid the
understanding is that the union is to a bargaining unit as a government is to a state
or smaller political unit. The analogy is
quite clear in the case of bargaining units
established by statutory authority; bargaining units are delineated by just such a
legislative act as lays out the bounds of
cities, villages, school districts, irrigation
districts and like subordinate governmental
units. A portion of the sovereign power
sufficient to accomplish the corporate purpose is delegated to the governing body of
such corporated universes; in the case of
labor, the sovereign powers are chiefly the
power to exclude other representatives
(usually unions) 7 and the power to bind,
in invitum, all employees within the universe
which constitutes the bargaining unit in
respect of-'¢vages, hours and working conditions so that none may contract for himself on other terms. 8 This latter is precisely
the aspect of sovereign power exercised by
Congress in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 9 by the Interstate Commerce Commission in establishing tariffs, by state
legislatures in Standard Fire Insurance
Policy Acts.
A scheme of taxation, carrying no other
obligation, is, therefore, morally indifferent
as such; although imposed by a "private"
organization, it is imposed in the right not
of that private organization but in the
right of that "public" or "perfect" society,
the "bargaining unit" of which it is, for
the time being, the governing body.' 0 The
remedy of dissidents is, as in any other
7 29 U.S.C. §159(a)

(1952).
8J. 1. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U. S. 332
(1944). Guilds are referred to as "self governing" (jure proprio) in Quadragesinio Anno. op.
cit. supra note 4, at para. 83, p. 143.
946 U.S.C. §1300 (1952).

"perfect" representative society, to seek to
become a majority and change or oust the
governing body.
It seems to the writer that once you admit the moral validity of the "compulsory
collective bargain" you cannot deny the
validity of a grant to the bargaining agency
of the fiscal rights appropriate to enabling
it to drive that bargain. When you have
swallowed the camel of compulsory terms
of employment, why strain at the gnat of
compulsory dues payment? Compulsory
terms of employment are surely a much
10 The sovereign character of "guilds of the
various industries and professions" is recognized;
the rules of political society are said to be applicable to these bodies. Quadragesimno Anno,
para. 86, Two BASIC SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 145
(The Catholic University of America Press,
1943). The following paragraph, 87, sharply contrasts the voluntary association with the "guilds."
The guild (collegio) contemplated by the Encyclical is, no doubt, a more extensive organization than the "single employer bargaining unit"
which results in most cases under the Wagner
Act but both enjoy sovereign powers and as
sovereigns would be entitled to tax for their corporate purposes (see Quadragesimo Anno, op. cit.
supra, at para. 92, p. 149, for the taxing power
of the guild). The corporate purposes of the
,'single employer bargaining unit" are limited to
the relationship of employer and employee inter
sese and hence there is no moral power of shop
cloture in such relationship. On the other hand,
both the craft union and the strict industrial
union approach the status of a "guild"; their
function is to prevent the wage rate from becoming a factor in competition between employers
by establishing and maintaining uniformity of
wage rates. Hence, if they are justifiable at all,
they are entitled to protect the integrity of the
craft or industry by requiring all workmen to
subscribe to the "laws" of the craft or industry
(shop cloture). Note that these unions, unlike
Wagner Act unions, are no mere representatives;
they conceive of themselves as "the craft" or "the
industry." If craft and strict industrial unions are
wrong, the state should abolish them; if they are
rightful organizations, the state should not deprive them of the powers necessary to perform
their functions.

2
greater invasion of the right to work than
the mere exaction of a non-discriminatory
tax thereon.
If the argument based upon freedom of
association is valid in respect of dues, it
is equally valid against the entire notion of
representative collective bargaining, i.e.,
the labor relations laws are themselves immoral. None of the disputants seems ready
to adopt this position.
Nor is the notion of benefit, insofar as
it underlies the validity of a tax, necessarily
associated with the individual as such.
School districts tax bachelors, spinsters and
the childless. Sewer assessments are laid
upon those with no sewage and those who
prefer cesspools. Those who are indifferent
to a common benefit, those who oppose or
reject the benefit and those who are positively harmed by the benefit may, without
violation of any moral principle, be taxed.
This is part of the cost of being a social
being.
The equation of private unions with public corporations is adverted to by Professor
Morris. The distinction drawn above, between the union and the bargaining unit,
while it adequately disposes of the objection, raises other questions. May governmental functions be delegated to a private
organization? The writer knows of no
moral objection to this, and there are many
instances in which it is done in practice.
The East India Company exercised sovereign powers, even to the making of war
and peace;1 1 the Mozambique Company
exercised sovereign powers until 1942.12
The A.S.P.C.A. exercises sovereign powers
11 Arcot v. East India Co., 4 Brown Ch. 180
(1793).
12 The government was known as "Goberno do
Territorio da Companhia de Mozambique."
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13
in respect to animals.
Another question raised might be the
ownership of funds accumulated for use
of the bargaining unit; do they belong to
the union or to the unit? Presently this
seems to be left to determination by private contract, and there would appear to
be no moral reason why it should not be
so; though there might be reasons rooted
in the policy of the N.L.R.A. why they
should belong to the unit.
Professor Morris directs his main attack,
rightly, at the writer's argument that shop
cloture may be justified morally where it is
necessary to maintain standards. Before
attempting a rebuttal, it might be well to
take a look at the magnitude of the issue
involved.
In substance, the writer is affirming and
Professor Morris is denying that the idea
of the craft union and the idea of the strict
industrial union are ideas consonant with
morality. These were the ideas which underlay the whole of the American labor
movement from the demise of the Knights
of Labor until the enactment of the Railway Labor Act. These same ideas now underlie the large segment of union labor
still operating (under legal difficulties) on
craft principles, e.g., the building trades
and the printing trades, and the other large
segment still operating (under similar legal
difficulties) on strict industrial union principles, e.g., the coal industry and the garment industry.
While the long and current acceptance
of such ideas is, to be sure, no proof that
morality inheres in them, it should make us
extremely cautious in condemning them.
More especially is this so when we consider that the ideas received wide statutory

13 Nicchia v. New York, 254 U. S. 228 (1920).
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approval by such enactments as "prevailing rate of wage" laws, union label laws
and the "stranger picketing" clause of the
Anti-Injunction Law. 1 4 And one who remembers the public opprobrium attaching
to the term "sweatshop" (i.e., substandard
shop) in the first quarter of this century
will be extremely slow to condemn a mechanism for maintaining standards even
though it may invade the "right to work"
for a substandard wage.
But Professor Morris' position is entitled to examination on its merits. He
makes the following points:
Point- The reasoning behind the
writer's position that the maintenance of
wage standards justifies shop cloture would
also justify the restriction of output to the
level of the least productive worker.
Answer - (a) This cannot happen under the scheme of the strict industrial union
for the standard is a "piece rate." Since a
worker who produces less is paid less in exact proportion, the least productive tend to
be excluded from or to leave the industry.
(b) In theory this should not happen
under the craft union scheme, and while
there are exceptions, in practice it usually
does not. Theoretically, a craft union is an
organization of skilled workers. A skilled
worker is not merely one who can perform
a given task, but one who can perform the
given task in a commercially practicable
time. The craft union, by theory, excludes
the unproductive worker from the field;
this indeed, before the Wagner Act, was
the "selling point" of the craft union to the
employer. "We have," they would say, "the
men who can perform your work in the
optimum time, therefore if you hire our
men even at our standard wage rates your
undertaking will be more profitable." In
14 29 U.S. . §§111-115 (1952).

most instances, they made good on the
promise, which was one of the reasons for
their success. In many crafts these are
powerful forces operating to exclude the
unproductive, e.g., in the building trades
the unproductive worker is soon spotted
and contractors refuse to hire him.
(c) Even in theory, Professor Morris'
point involves a non-sequitur. The wrong
done to a displaced worker is not the loss
of his job as such; it is the diminution of
the value of his right to work by another's
undertaking to work for less than the job
is reasonably worth. As pointed out in the
writer's original article, displacement of
the less efficient worker by the more efficient involves no moral stigma. 1 5 Employers themselves under moral obligation to
operate efficiently, 1 6 cannot be saddled
with inefficient help; labor has the positive
duty to be efficient. 17 The moral law sanctions no premium on inefficiency; "to each
according to his contribution to the product" is a fairly accurate summary of the
moral viewpoint.
are wrong because
Point -Standards
"the values of the services which different
people are able or willing to render are of
varying worth."
Answer-This is a generalization which
is true in some aspects and untrue in other
and crucial aspects. Obviously, the value
of a ton of coal drilled, blasted and lying
on the mine floor ready for loading is not
any greater or any less because Miner
Smith rather than Miner Jones drilled and
blasted. A union which sets a standard
piece rate on a ton of coal, therefore, has,
15 Fitzpatrick, Morality of Right-To-Work Laws,
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 91, 97 (April 1956).
16 Quadragesimo Anno, para. 72, Two BASIC
SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 135 (The Catholic University of America Press, 1943).

17 Id. at para. 61, p. 129.

2
as between Miners Jones and Smith,
achieved equity. It has also achieved a
rough equity of labor cost as between
Mineowner "A" and Mineowner "B." And
it has prevented either mineowner and his
employees from operating a "sweatshop"
to the detriment of the other and his employees.
Although it is perhaps more difficult for
the uninitiated to see, the time rate of the
crafts works out in just about the same
way. The mason contractor, for example,
must compute his bid price in most cases
without knowledge of which particular
bricklayers may be available to do his job.
He resorts, therefore to a computation
based upon his knowledge of what the
average bricklayer will produce. In effect,
he has agreed to sell to the property owner
inter alia the labor of bricklayers at a price
computed by applying a standard wage
rate to a standard production. If, in the
execution of the job, an individual bricklayer fails to meet the standard production,
he will be "knocked off." Thus a rough
sort of equity is achieved both between
individual bricklayers and between competing employers. So, in commercial practice, the "varying values of the services"
of individuals are roughly standardized.
Point- "The mere erection and maintenance of fixed 'standards' cannot be surrounded with an aura of morality."
Answer- The establishment of common standards is unquestionably moral in
order that workers "each alone and defenseless" be protected not only from "the
inhumanity of employers" but also from
"the greed of competitors." 18 Nor can "the
right ordering of economic life be left
18 Rerum Novaruin, para. 6, Two BASIC SOCIAL
ENCYCLICALS 5 (The Catholic University of
America Press, 1943).
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(wholly) to a free competition of forces."' 19
Some trades and industries are so constituted that unless a standard (the negation of free competition) be maintained,
the weaker bidder for jobs will set the tone
of and demoralize the labor market. In a
demoralized market "those who give least
heed to their conscience" 20 will crush their
,more conscientious competitors." 2 1 Demoralization of the labor market tends
toward a demoralization of the product
market in which the employers willing to
pay a reasonable wage ("fair" employers)
are squeezed out of competition and must
either cut wages or cease to operate.
In the course of any such cycle, the
value of the right of the whole craft or
industry to work is depreciated. The question then is clearly:
May a man so exercise his own right to
work that the right of many others to work
is damaged or may he be restrained in the
exercise of his right to work by the requirement that he observe the standard of the
industry or craft for work of like quantity
and quality?
Clearly, if it is right to require me to
exercise my right to drive my jeep so as
not to injure my neighbor's Cadillac, it is
right to set a minimum on the exercise of
my right to work; and the fact that private
organizations set the minimum has no
bearing on its morality.
Point -Standards
require monopoly
which is wrong because it is the improper
application of force.
Answer -Standards,
it is true, require
monopoly. But Rerum Novarum recognizes
19 Quadragesino Anno, op. cit. supra note 16,
at paras. 87, 107, 110, pp. 145, 157, 159.
20 Quadragesirno Anno, para. 107, Two BASIC
SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS 157 (The Catholic University of America Press, 1943).
21 Id. at para. 134, p. 179.
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that monopoly of a sort (quoddam monopolii privilegium) may be necessary to a
(craft or industry) labor agreement and
further recognizes that such agreements
may be made binding on dissidents. 22 The
caution against excessive raising or lowering of wages seems to be directed against
23
monopolistically established rates.
While there is force in a monopoly, the
wrongfulness of its exercise cannot be determined without reference to the objective
for which it is brought to bear. If the
objective is rightful, force which does no
other damage may be used. If the objective is wrongful, the force is wrongful.
Hence we are thrown back to the question of whether the maintenance of a
standard is a rightful objective. If the
standard be not unreasonable (e.g., too
high) there would appear to be no moral
objection to its maintenance. "A monopoly
is no immoral act, but only against the
politic part of our law....1-24
Point-Material benefits which flow
from the maintenance of standards cannot
justify the restriction on man's freedom
necessary to maintain standards.
Answer-The economic and moral
orders are not entirely independent of each
other. 25 Man's freedom may be and often
is circumscribed by material considerations.
He may not, for instance, use his freedom
to make noise on his own land to injure
the business of his neighbor, 26 nor his
para. 72, Two BASIC SOCIAL
67 (The Catholic University of
America Press, 1943).
23 Id. at para. 74, p. 69.

22 Rerum Novarum,
ENCYCLICALS

24 East India Co. v. Sandys, 10 How. St. Tr. 371

(1684).
25 Quadragesino

Anno, para. 42, Two BASIC

111 (The Catholic University of America Press, 1943).
26 Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East. 574 (1809).
SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS

right to hire an employee so that he in27
jures his competitor.
While it is true that man does not owe
his freedom to society or to the state, it
does not follow that society is impotent
to restrict his freedom for good cause. The
burden is, of course, upon society or the
state to show that the restriction is limited
to the achievement of an end intra vires
the society which imposes it. The prevention of the ill effects of unbridled competition in certain trades is within the
proper ambit of society;28 the method of
establishing a standard to accomplish that
end restricts the individual no more than
is necessary to prevent the damage; a man
may work for any but a substandard wage.
In general, right-to-work laws are consonant with and required by morality. A
mere tax imposed for the purposes of the
bargaining unit, though payable to a union,
is not immoral and the act of a legislature
granting or withholding the right to tax is
morally indifferent. The use of shop
cloture to establish standards of wages and
conditions uniform for all workers and all
employers engaged in a given craft or industry wherein such standards are required
to prevent destruction of reasonable wage
levels by unregulated competition is consonant with morality, and legislatures are
under moral obligation either to permit
shop cloture or to arrange a substitute
device capable of accomplishing the preservation of reasonable wage levels. If shop
cloture is permitted it is the duty of the
legislature to regulate the resulting monopoly to prevent damage to workers, employers and the public.
27

Lumley v. Gye, 2 Ell. & B1. 216 (1853).

28 Quadragesirno Anno, op. cit. supra note 25,
at para. 110, p. 159.

